| Soviet Union |
This article is part of the series: |
|
|
|
Government
Communist Party
Leadership
Legislature
Judiciary
Economy
Society
|
|
Atlas |
The Era of Stagnation (often called the Period of Stagnation, Stagnation Period, the Brezhnevian Stagnation or the Brezhnev stagnation) was an economic, political and social stagnation in the Soviet Union which began during the rule of Leonid Brezhnev, and continued under Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko and ended when Mikhail Gorbachev introduced his policies of glasnost, perestroika, uskoreniye and demokratizatsiya. It resulted in the eventual fall of communism in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.
Historians, scholars and specialists are uncertain what caused the stagnation in the first place. Arguments vary, some claiming that the planned economy was doomed to failure from the very beginning, and other claiming the lack of reform or the high expenditure on defence led to economic stagnation. The majority of scholars set the starting year for economic stagnation either at 1973 or 1975; some people claim that the stagnation began as early as the 1960s. The social stagnation began much earlier, with Brezhnev's rise to power. Brezhnev reverted several of his Nikita Khrushchev's, his predecessor, liberal reforms, and he partially rehabilitated Joseph Stalin. The social stagnation can therefore be traced back to the Sinyavsky–Daniel trial in 1965. Politically, the stagnation began with the establishment of a gerontocracy, which came into being as part of the policy of stability.
Brezhnev has been criticised posthumously for doing to little to improve the economic situation. Throughout Brezhnev'a rule, no major reforms were initiated. And the few reform attempts but forward were either very modest, or opposed by the majority of the Soviet leadership. The reform-minded Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Government), Alexei Kosygin introduced two modest reforms in the 1970s, after the failure of his more radical 1965 reform, and attempted to reverse the trend of declining growth. When Brezhnev died in November 1982 the Soviet Union he handed over to his successor, Andropov, was much less dynamic. Andropov, during his short rule, introduced modest reforms, but died little more then a year later in February 1984. Andropov's successor, Chernenko, continued much of Andropov's policies. There is a debate amongst scholars if Andropov's and Chernenko's policies improved the economic situation in the country.
Contents |
The term, Era of Stagnation, was coined by Mikhail Gorbachev to describe the economic difficulties which developed when Leonid Brezhnev ruled the Soviet Union.[1] Gorbachevians, have criticised Brezhnev, and Brezhnevism in general, for being to conservative, and failing to change with the times.[2] Gorbachev once referred to Brezhnev's rule as "the lowest stage of socialism".[3]
Scholars disagree on when or why the stagnation began, but it generally refers to the period when Brezhnev ruled the country (see Analyses section). The economic problems which began under Brezhnev persisted into the short administrations of Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, however, its disputed if their policies improved the economic situation. The Era of Stagnation ended with Gorbachev's rise to power; the economy was still stagnating,[4] but political and social life was democratised.[5][6] The social stagnation began with the Sinyavsky–Daniel trial, which marked the end of Nikita Khrushchev's "Thaw".[7] Some have dated the beginning of the social stagnation as far back as 1968, to the suppression of the Prague Spring.[8]
Brezhnev himself declared the era as the period of Developed Socialism in 1971 at the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The term "Developed Socialism" came into being in response to Khrushchev's promise of reaching communism in 20 years.[9] There are several people who considers this the best era in Soviet history to live; the standard of living improved and for the first time in Soviet history, stable social security, low levels of social inequality and there was stability – to much stability according to some.[10]
According to Edwin Bacon and Mark Sandle, the authors of Brezhnev Reconsidered, the economy under Brezhnev was as dynamic as the economy presided over by Nikita Khrushchev, but the economy Brezhnev handed over to Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko was much less dynamic.[11] Mark Harrison claims that the economic performance of the Brezhnev era has not been looked at objectively; a "tendency" developed were people tended to use lower estimates to get their points through.[12] Harrison further claims that in the period 1928 to 1973 the Soviet economy grew in a phase that would surpass the United States "one day". 1973, the year of the international oil crisis, growth in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc halted abruptly at a much sharper and longer phase than in the Western Bloc.[13] It was in the mid-1970s that the economy started to stagnate;[14] one explanation, according to Mark Harrison, is that the Soviet economy could not continue to follow its extensive growth patterns,[15] another explanation is the Soviet Union, and the communist bloc in general, lack of transparency with the outside world which hindered globalisation,[16] or that the Soviet authorities misinterpreted the post–World War II economic boom as "permanent" which in turn led to faulty economic decisions.[17] They claim that the economy phased on to Mikhail Gorbachev was in a "pre-crisis situation"; the economy was still growing, both internal and external debts were low, and the economy handed to Gorbachev was more vibrant and dynamic then that handed over to Andropov and Chernenko – the economic policies of Andropov and Chernenko had improved the economic situation in the country.[18]
In The Rise and Fall of Communism Archie Brown, the author, claims that the term Era of Stagnation "was in many ways a fitting description, for this was a period of declining growth". But also noted in could be misleading, in non-economic spheres.[19] Brown also admits to high growth rates in the mid-to-late 1960s (during the Eighth Five-Year Plan), claiming that the Soviet economy "enjoyed stronger growth in the second half of the 1960s that it ever did thereafter". The link between these growth rates and the Kosygin reform is, according to Brown, "tenuous".[20] He also admits that "From the point of view of communist rulers, the Brezhnev era was in many ways successful".[21] While the Soviet Union was in no way an economic power, through its natural resources, it had a strong economic foundation. For instance, the 1973 oil crisis, "turned out to be an energy bonanza" for the Soviet Union.[22] According to Brown, it was a sign of weakness that the Soviet Union grew so dependent of her natural resources, as she did in the 1970s.[21]
Robert Service, the author of the History of Modern Russia: From Tsarism to the Twenty-first Century, claims that with the mounting economic problems, worker discipline decreased.[23] The Government had no effective counter-measure to halt this decrease in discipline, because of the policy of full unemployment. Because of this policy, according to Robert Service, government industries such as factories, mines and offices were staffed by undisciplined personnel who put a great effort into not doing their jobs. This ultimately led to a "work-shy workforce" among Soviet workers and administrators.[24] While the Soviet Union under Brezhnev had the "second greatest industrial capacity" after the United States, and produced more "steel, oil, pig-iron, cement and [...] tractors" than any other country in the world.[25] Service treats the problems of agriculture during the Breznhev era as proof of the need for "de-collectivisation".[26] In short, Service considers the Soviet economy to have become "static" during this time period,[27] and Brezhnev's policy of stability was, according to Robert Service, a "recipe for political disaster".[28]
Philip Hanson, the author of The Rise and Fall of the Soviet economy: an Economic History of the USSR from 1945, claims that the label stagnation is not "entirely unfair". Brezhnev, according to Hanson, did preside over a period of slowdown in economic growth, but claims that the Brezhnev era started with good growth. Growth during the early Brezhnev era was higher then the growth during the end of Khrushchev's rule. Economic slowdown began in 1973, "when even the official estimates began to show Soviet per capita production no longer closing the gap with the US." Before 1973, there was a reform period launched by Alexei Kosygin; many believed that these reforms would become as radical as those in the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia and the previous reform attempts in Hungary.[29] Growth during the Brezhnev era did not stop, as many assume, according to Hanson, but started to stagnate.[30] However, not everything stagnated, per capita consumption grew by 1.9 durin the 1970s, which is, according to Hanson, a "highly respectable rate" of growth. Another point which Hanson makes is that, in contrast to the repressive policies of Joseph Stalin and Khrushchev's policies which wreaked instability, the Brezhnev era was stable; it was a "period of (comparative) plenty".[31]
Robert Vincent Daniels in his book, Russia's Transformation: Snapshots of a Crumbling System, claimed that the hallmark of the Brezhnev era was the status quo, which in turn led to the development of a great paradox; "the contradictions of what it was and what it could be became obvious". High population growth and urban growth, which was higher than the United States. The entire net growth was channelled into the urban sector, leading to a growth rate above 50 percent and nearly reached the two-third mark. Industrial development continued to grow rapidly, and in certain sector surpassed the United States;[32] for instance, coal production in the Soviet Union increased from 85 metric tons in 1964 to 149 metric tons in 1981 while in the United States it grew from 100 metric tons in 1964 to 130 metric tons in 1981.[33] The Soviet Union became the largest exporter of petroleum in the world, and by the end of the Tenth Five-Year Plan (1976–1981) the Soviet GNP "reached about 60 percent of the American level, and the net current investment was actually greater in absolute terms". The failure then, according to Daniels, was that the Soviet economy was not able to deliver in certain sectors; for instance, throughout Soviet history, deficiencies in agriculture and consumer goods always existed. Agriculture was always a problem, but in the Brezhnev era the Soviet Union became the largest producer of wheat in the world, but could hardly produce meat to meet its own ends.[34] According to Daniels, the economy began to stagnate in 1975, not 1973, and that the period that followed contradicted the previous period "in almost every way".[35]
Richard Sakwa, the author of the The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union: 1917–1991, takes a more dim view on the Brezhnev era, claiming that growth rates fell "inexorably" from the 1950s until they stopped completely in the 1980s. The reason for this stagnation, according to Sakwa, was the growing demand for unskilled workers, the decline of productivity and labour discipline. Sakwa believes that stability itself led to stagnation, and claimed that without strong leadership "Soviet socialism had a tendency to relapse into stagnation."[36]
| Period | GNP (according to the CIA) |
NMP (according to Grigorii Khanin) |
NMP (according to the USSR) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1960–1965 | 4.8[37] | 4.4[37] | 6.5[37] |
| 1965–1970 | 4.9[37] | 4.1[37] | 7.7[37] |
| 1970–1975 | 3.0[37] | 3.2[37] | 5.7[37] |
| 1975–1980 | 1.9[37] | 1.0[37] | 4.2[37] |
| 1980–1985 | 1.8[37] | 0.6[37] | 3.5[37] |
|
|
|||
One of the main causes for Khrushchev's dismissal from power was the relatively poor economic growth during the early 1960s. For instance, the economy grew by 6 percent from 1951 to 1955, 5.8 percent from 1956 to 1960 and 5 percent from 1961 to 1965; economic growth was declining in every sphere. Labour productivity which had grown 4.7 percent from the 1950s to 1962, declined to 4 percent in the early 1960s. Growth, capital, out and investments were all showing signs of steady decline.[46] Another problem was that Khrushchev promised to much, even promising to reach communism in 20 years which was practically impossible with the then-current economic indicators.[9] This, and other promises and problems, led to his dismissal in October 1964[47] by a collective leadership led by Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin. To counter Khrushchev's promise of reaching communism, the Soviet leadership created the term, Developed socialism, which ment that the Soviet Union had developed an advanced enough stage that the country would move "naturally" to communism (in an unspecified amount of time).[48]
Khrushchev's dismissal, led to the establishment of a more conservative Politburo; Kosygin, Nikolai Podgorny and Andrei Kirilenko were the most liberal members, Brezhnev and Arvīds Pelše belonged to the moderate faction while Mikhail Suslov retained his leadership of the party's hardliners.[49] Kosygin and Brezhnev fought bitter struggles over economic policy; Kosygin wanted to increase investments in consumer goods and light industry, Brezhnev on the other hand, wanted to increase investments in heavy industry, agriculture and defence.[50] In 1965, Kosygin managed to introduce an economic reform, widely referred to as the "Kosygin reform", which tried to reform the planned economy within a socialist framework. Kosygin tried to improve the Soviet economy by copying some of the measures used in the Western Bloc, such as profit making for instance.[51] Brezhnev allowed the reform to proceed because the Soviet economy was entering a period of low growth.[52] Kosygin's reforms on agriculture gave considerable autonomy to the collective farms, giving them the right to the contents of private farming. During the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1966–1970), there was the large-scale land reclamation programme, the construction of irrigation channels, and other measures.[10][note 2] The reform itself failed, and the link between the high growth rate during the Eighth Five-Year Plan and the Kosygin reform are "tenuous".[53]
Brezhnev era, which had begun with high growth rates, began to stagnate sometimes in the early-1970s. Kosygin's "radical" reform attempts were halted in 1971, and his second reform was more modest. The reform was halted because of the 1973 oil crisis, when an international increase in oil price prompted high economic growth. Another reform was implemented in 1979. This reform failed, by this time, the Soviet economy had become "addicted" to high oil prices.[10]
In 1980, the Soviet Union took first place in Europe and second worldwide in terms of industrial and agricultural production, respectively. In 1960, the Soviet Union's industrial output was only 55% that of America, but this increased to 80% in 1980. In social terms, the 18 years of Brezhnev's leadership of the Communist Party saw real incomes grow more than 1.5 times. More than 1.6 billion square meters of living space were commissioned and provided to over 160 million people. At the same time, the average rent for families did not exceed 3% of the family income. There was unprecedented affordability of housing, health care, and education. As the circulation of the work force could not be balanced by salaries, there was a lack of workers in some areas, largely in the agricultural sector. This was attempted to be solved by forcing older pupils, students and in some cases even soldiers to work for some limited time as agricultural workers (the practice has been informally called 'наряды на картошку' (naryady na kartoshku, "assignments to potato fields")).[10]
One of the causes of stagnation was the increased expenditure on the Soviet armed forces over consumer goods and other economic spheres.[3] Andrei Sakharov, the veteran dissident, in a letter to Brezhnev dating to 1980, claimed that the increasing expenditure on the armed forces was stalling economic growth.[54] David Michael Kotz and Fred Weir, the authors of Revolution from Above: The Demise of the Soviet System, states that militarisation can't be the reason for economic stagnation. The Soviet Union had always had a high military budget, in 1950 17 percent of gross national product (GNP) was devoted to defence. Since then, the defence budget gradually increased on the same level as economic growth. Considering that this was not a problem previously, this argument, according to them, does not hold. When the economy started to stagnate in 1973, economic growth in the rest of the world plummeted due to the 1973 oil crisis, and the Soviet economy grew because of its role as the largest oil exporter. It was also around this time the economy began to stagnate. As a whole, economic activity since the 1973 oil crisis has decreased permanently in the Soviet Union, the Western Bloc and Japan, but in the Soviet Union it was much more pronounced. The oil crisis is not to blame for the Soviet difficulties as the increase in oil prices actually increased the country's hard currency earnings. Because of this, the economic stagnation can only be explained by internal problems, not external.[55]
In fact, Soviet society became static. Post-Stalinist reforms initiated under Nikita Khrushchev were discontinued. Not all the people accepted the ideology of stagnation. Disloyalty was punished. Unauthorised meetings and demonstrations were suppressed.[56] Dissidents were routinely arrested.[57][58] Supporters of these meetings and demonstrations claimed that the arrests were illegal, because there is no criminality in the realization of the human right to obtain and distribute information. They asserted this right was part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)[59] and the final act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (1975).[60]
During the introduction of glasnost, many writers claimed that they did not know about the repression of citizens who did not support the Brezhnev stagnation.[61] From the other side, artists propagating "Soviet values" formed a well paid, elite group that enjoyed an easy life and high social status. The requirements for art (generalized under name of Socialist realism) were not as rude and straightforward as during Stalinism.
Scientific fields such as genetics and computer science that were officially forbidden during Stalinism were no longer repressed. The most of remaining pressure concentrated on historical and social sciences. However, history and social sciences material were usually written in a theme that was in tune with Soviet ideology. In particular, the departments of Scientific Communism and Scientific Atheism were mandatory in many universities.
The overall level of science varied but in some cases was at the same level with the rest of the world. For instance, Dubnium was discovered by Soviet scientists at the Dubna research center. However, the science level was not balanced between disciplines, with some topics, such as advanced electronics, being researched much less than others, such as nuclear physics.
Despite certain stagnation in economy and social life the Soviet Arts and the Soviet sports were both flourishing during the Brezhnev's era. The Soviet school of ballet was considered as one of the best in the world. The Soviet Olympic teams constantly won 1st ranks at the Olympics back in time and lots of the films which are now considered as the "Soviet classics" were done in the "stagnation" period.
The stagnation effectively continued under Brezhnev's successors, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, until perestroika was initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1986[62], where the state of the Soviet economy went from stagnation to deterioration, which ultimately culminated in the Dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.
| Preceded by Khrushchev Thaw |
History of Russia History of the Soviet Union 14 October 1964 – 10 March 1985 |
Succeeded by Perestroika |
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||